

PROBLEM AREAS

1. EUROPE AND NATO

UNCLASSIFIED

a. MLF/ANF

b. Alternatives (if ANF fails)

9200777

2. OUTSIDE EUROPE

a. India

b. Japan

c. Israel/UAR

FOIA Exemptions  
EXEMPTIONS  
( ) RELEASE  
( ) EXCISE  
( ) DENY  
( ) DELETE Non-Responsive Info  
( ) DECLASSIFY IN PART  
( ) DECLASSIFY

3. MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS

*Non-Dissen — Non-Acquisition*  
a. NDNA

b. Comprehensive Test Ban

c. Nuclear Free Zones

d. No-first-use Policy

e. U.S. - USSR

EO Classification  
( ) CLASSIFY as  
( ) S or ( ) C or ( ) D or ( ) TS  
( ) DOWNGRADE TS to ( ) S or ( ) C or ( ) D or ( ) TS  
TS authority is

UNCLASSIFIED

#### 4. PEACEFUL USES

- a. EURATOM
- b. IAEA and Bilaterals

#### 5. U.S. WEAPONS POLICIES

- a. Overseas Deployments
- b. Physical Security
- c. R&D

#### 6. POLICIES TOWARD EXISTING NUCLEAR POWERS

- a. France
- b. U.K.
- c. Chinese
- d. USSR

## COURSE III

## ACTIONS

- (a) MLF/ANF - Build up NATO without independent nuclear forces (NSAM 322). Fold U.K. deterrent into ANF and leave a place for France. Also encourage and support German initiatives toward reunification. Official publication of NSAM 322 contents. Convey to Soviets U.S. intent with regard to U.S. veto and European clause.
- (b) Alternatives (if ANF fails) - Try to block German efforts toward nuclear capability with independent force or in concert with France by:
- (1) Increased nuclear consultation, including joint planning and targeting; place FRG on Standing Group; more FRG spaces at SHAPE-Omaha
  - (2) More or better bilateral nuclears (e.g., longer-range missiles under two-key control)
  - (3) Broader role for NATO, both militarily and in non-military areas
  - (4) Threat of U.S. withdrawal

(a) India -

- (1) Military guarantees against nuclear attack (with Soviets? Under UN or NDNA auspices?)
- (2) Push India into leading role in non-spread treaty
- (3) Support India for permanent UN Security Council seat
- (4) Safeguarded scientific assistance to boost prestige (e.g., space, power reactors, oceanography)
- (5) Reconsider economic aid
- (6) Point out inadequacy of Indian deterrent and way in which it might dilute U.S. or Soviet commitments

(b) Japan -

- (1) Reassert and expand defense commitment
- (2) Joint planning and consultation on U.S. targeting against China
- (3) Mix of incentives, guarantees and implied threats as with India

(c) Israel/UAR - Couple assurances against being overrun by UAR with explicit threats of specific sanctions (e.g., economic, security withdrawal, assistance to UAR) if Israel decides to arm with nuclear weapons. For UAR: Indicate pressure being applied to Israel can succeed only if UAR also avoids nuclear weapons. Make strong efforts to restrain France and FRG missile assistance to Israel/UAR; work for Soviet cooperation in keeping the confrontation non-nuclear.

(a) NDNA - Press for urgent conclusion of non-spread treaty without waiting for resolution of the MLF/ANF issue and recognizing that there may have to be adjustments in the U.S. position on these two objectives.

(b) Comprehensive Test Ban - Support strongly with reduced number of inspection recognizing that Plowshare may have to be abandoned. Pressure reluctant signer

(c) Nuclear Free Zones - Support in Latin America and Africa (and for Israel-Arabs); be willing to yield on transit rights, declarations and verification.

(d) No-first-use Policy - None.

(e) U.S. - USSR -

- (1) Fissile materials cut-off with reduced verification
- (2) Strategic delivery vehicle freeze plus significant agreed reductions (e.g., 30%) (verification required)
- (3) Reciprocal halt in ABM, launchers, and SDV deployments or transfers (for, e.g., 18 months)

Consider having single inspection quota apply to two or more of above measures.

## COURSE III

(a) Euratom -

- (2) Strategic delivery, vehicle freeze plus significant agreed reductions (e.g., 30%) (verification required)
- (3) Reciprocal halt in ABM, launchers, and SDV deployments or transfers (for, e.g., 18 months)

Consider having single inspection quota apply to two or more of above measures.

### COURSE III

(a) Euratom -

- (1) Exert greater pressure on Euratom to obtain satisfactory U.S. verification of safeguards (including possible use of plutonium sale as leverage).
- (2) Work toward Euratom acceptance of IAEA safeguard system (including possible conditioning U.S. assistance on Euratom acceptance IAEA safeguards).
- (3) Consider extension of IAEA operational activities to plant operation, for example, international plutonium separation plants.
- (4) Consider "leasing" rather than local ownership of fuel elements

(b) IAEA and Bilaterals -

- (1) Increased U.S. efforts to build up IAEA, including broader responsibilities, larger budget and improved technical capabilities
- (2) Greater pressure on all nations, including supplying nations, to accept IAEA safeguards on all reactors and separation plants with offer in return to extend safeguards to additional U.S. facilities

(a) Overseas Deployments -

- (1) Push for adoption of revised NATO strategy stressing non-nuclear option and less reliance on tactical weapons followed by reductions in Europe; meanwhile, no further deployments
- (2) Separate nuclear from conventional U.S. forces; publicize
- (3) Information policies minimizing role and importance of nuclear weapons as foundation for later possible no-first-use policy

(b) Physical Security -

- (1) Continue PAL installation on overseas weapons
- (2) Improved safeguards against seizure (e.g., self-destructive weapons)

(c) R&D -

- (1) Reorient development of ABM for possible use against limited threats
- (2) Develop TMRBM for potential U.S. use in Asia

(a) France -

- (1) Press for international measures to impede French program (prohibitions on overflights, etc., related to tests) unless France accepts partial test ban (conflict with NSAM 322?)
- (2) Broad interpretation of NSAM 294 (conflict with NSAM 322?)
- (3) Encourage merger with ANF
- (4) Make available technology of PALs and other safeguards

(b) U.K. -

- (1) Urge White Paper on high cost/low yield of nuclear program
- (2) Push for abandonment of independent deterrent
- (3) Consider repeal of 1958 amendment authorizing assistance to advanced nations
- (4) PALs for U.K. weapons

(c) Chinese - High-level intensive study to resolve the dilemma implicit in:

- (1) The need, over the long term, to bring China into arms control agreements, and to recognize her and admit her into the UN;
- (2) The immediate risk of rewarding nuclear accession and thereby impelling India and others toward a nuclear weapons decision

(d) USSR - Consider immediate approaches to Soviets seeking cooperation on a broad basis on non-proliferation and disarmament, and possibly on achieving national and regional stability in areas where respective vital national interests are not involved. Make available technology of PALs and other weapons safeguards

## CONSEQUENCES

### COURSE III

1. (a) U.S. pressure and slowed proliferation elsewhere would keep FRG in line for an extra 5-10 years (and perhaps longer). This could be at the cost of amicable U.S. -FRG relations. More hopefully FRG interest in, and progress toward, reunification might reduce pressures for acquisition of nuclear weapons.

(b) Extreme French irritation at U.S. opposition to testing would make withdrawal from NATO more likely; thus, so long as de Gaulle lives, France would be unlikely to join ANF and continuing French resentment might even preclude subsequent participation.

(c) If USSR really was persuaded U.S. was prepared to hold the line on German acquisition of nuclear weapons, progress toward European settlements and German reunification might be possible despite ANF (though realization of peaceful reunification would be impossible with Germany in the ANF and strong NATO).

(d) With proliferation slowed elsewhere, and FRG in check, other European nuclear capabilities would be much delayed.

2. (a) An optimum package including guarantees might stop India from going ahead with a nuclear program for at least 3 to 5 years. This would have desirable effects in Pakistan and elsewhere. A determined stand by India against nuclear proliferation could have a big impact on other countries. Unfortunately, even the present program might not succeed over the long term, and an eventual Indian nuclear decision would result in similar decisions in Pakistan and elsewhere.

(b) Similar results for Japan as in the case of India, but with a greater probability of long-term success, due to greater Japanese industrial strength and organizational capabilities.

(c) Such a program might be able to delay Israel/UAR acquisition indefinitely, assuming no sharply heightened security problems or intervening outside assistance to UAR. All of Africa might remain free of nuclear weapons.

(d) Other nations might be kept in line, the critical factor probably being success with India. Weapons acquisition would probably be delayed at least 5-10 years.

3. (a) Soviets would probably initially insist on abandonment of ANF concept. U.S. would have to face the question very early. If U.S. and Soviets could agree on an NDNA measure, an agreement with most nations other than Chinese and satellites, and perhaps France, would probably result. This agreement, coupled with other measures, could have an increasingly stabilizing effect.

(b) An agreement would probably result if a consensus could be reached with Soviets on inspection, which might also be useful in conjunction with other disarmament measures.

(c) Nuclear Free Zone agreements would probably result in Africa and Latin America and would serve to reinforce other agreements; there would be

(c) Nuclear Free Zone agreements would probably result in increased Latin America and would serve to reinforce other agreements; there would be

a fair chance of extension to the Arab-Israeli area. U.S. could probably adjust at relatively low cost to a curtailment of transit rights.

(d) None.

(e) Modest U.S.-USSR reductions could probably be agreed upon; they would diminish tensions and make greater U.S.-USSR cooperation possible; they might have marginal effect upon proliferation incentives.

4. (a) External safeguards on Euratom would hamper European developments and possibly enhance psychological restrictions on national programs; if control led to Euratom's collapse, independent programs might arise as substitutes. In either case, French and other European resentment could result, especially during de Gaulle's lifetime. Effective external safeguards on Euratom would remove a significant and notorious exception to the IAEA system.

(b) It will be difficult to obtain enough leverage on Nth nations and their other suppliers to ensure complete success with external controls (France and China will be very unlikely to cooperate and others might not also; IAEA controls may not turn out to be completely effective even if established). Yet even partial success would serve to delay development of basic weapons technology and make decisions to undertake weapons programs more difficult.

5. (a) Reduced emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons will create a Western European need for U.S. (and Soviet) reassurances and (possibly) compensatory Soviet moves. In the absence of such measures and movement toward detente, European incentives for independent nuclear capabilities could increase.

(b) British, and particularly French, might balk at PALs.

(c) (1) No defense system could prevent deaths of millions, even at the hands of lesser powers; broad but thin ABMs plus SAMs plus shelters (at a cost of \$5-10 billion) might limit potential damage to the U.S. or the USSR from lesser powers to 10-20 million deaths; sophisticated system (at a cost of \$30 billion) would do better but might upset U.S.-Soviet stability.

6. (a) France would be furious; would proceed with programs with only modest delays; might withdraw from NATO. Improbable that she would join ANF in de Gaulle's lifetime. The example to Nth nations would be present, but might be marginal unless we went even further.

(b) U.K. would probably cooperate; U.K. White Paper would have a desirable effect but not a very significant one since most countries would have an interest in nuclear capabilities to deal with less sophisticated threats than that of the USSR. U.K. might willingly agree to give up special relationship in an ANF context.

(c) It would be a long time before China would cooperate, and in the meantime, the pressures on India and Japan would continue.

(d) Soviets could prove unwilling to alter policies, such as hostility to any form of ANF, and competition with the Chinese could lead them to even more intractable positions. However, their long-range interests in stopping simultaneous nuclear encirclement by both the Chinese and the Germans might lead to limited but effective cooperation with the U.S.

success would serve to delay development of basic weapons technology and make decisions to undertake weapons programs more difficult.

5. (a) Reduced emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons will create a Western European need for U.S. (and Soviet) reassurances and (possibly) compensatory Soviet moves. In the absence of such measures and movement toward detente, European incentives for independent nuclear capabilities could increase.

(b) British, and particularly French, might balk at PALs.

(c) (1) No defense system could prevent deaths of millions, even at the hands of lesser powers; broad but thin ABMs plus SAMs plus shelters (at a cost of \$5-10 billion) might limit potential damage to the U.S. or the USSR from lesser powers to 10-20 million deaths; sophisticated system (at a cost of \$30 billion) would do better but might upset U.S. -Soviet stability.

6. (a) France would be furious; would proceed with programs with only modest delays; might withdraw from NATO. Improbable that she would join ANF in de Gaulle's lifetime. The example to Nth nations would be present, but might be marginal unless we went even further.

(b) U.K. would probably cooperate; U.K. White Paper would have a desirable effect but not a very significant one since most countries would have an interest in nuclear capabilities to deal with less sophisticated threats than that of the USSR. U.K. might willingly agree to give up special relationship in an ANF context.

(c) It would be a long time before China would cooperate, and in the meantime, the pressures on India and Japan would continue.

(d) Soviets could prove unwilling to alter policies, such as hostility to any form of ANF, and competition with the Chinese could lead them to even more intractable positions. However, their long-range interests in stopping simultaneous nuclear encirclement by both the Chinese and the Germans might lead to limited but effective cooperation with the U.S.

### Overall

This course should succeed in substantially retarding proliferation (bringing a pause of perhaps 10-15 years). Inability to arrive at a non-spread agreement (due to problems with ANF or for other reasons) would substantially reduce possibilities of success. Permanent success would probably depend on subsequent movement toward disarmament which in turn would require bringing France into concert with her neighbors and the eventual growth of responsibility in China. The latter event may be remote.

The principal costs would be:

(1) Temporary (and perhaps indefinite) alienation of France; resentment of FRG, and perhaps India and Israel, over U.S. pressures; and irritation of other Nth nations over controls and pressures for reactor safeguards.

(2) Risk that guarantees to India might involve us in conflict with China.